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ABSTRACT1
"Money"is a theoretical concept whose imperfect realization has assumed
theform of a sequence of particular physical objects. Since the supply
process for each particular physical object is unique, an object which is
"money" in one epoch may he supplanted in another epoch by an object whose
supply process is (perhaps temporarily) superior. While there exists a flow
of objects through the category called "money", the sequence of "money"
objects in modern times has been so limited that it can readily be characterized
as a "gold-fiat-gold" cycle.
Given the recurrent use of gold as a monetary standard, economic agents
will believe that gold may be restored by a government as a money, even in an
epoch in which gold is demonetized. Fluctuations in the intensity of such
beliefs must then be reflected in gold price fluctuations.
Recently, large movements in the price of gold have initiated two lines
of thought concerning government gold market policy. First, Salant and
Henderson 1978 (S-H hereafter), have developed a partial equilibrium gold
market model to analyze the interaction between rapid gold price rises and
government gold auctions. Second, Laffer (1979) has advocated a return
to the monetary gold standard.' Simultaneously, Barro (1979) has constructed
a model to study money and price dynamics under a gold standard. The present
paper integrates these approaches, together with a method recently devised by
Krugman (1979) to study exchange crises, to construct a framework for simul-
taneously analyzing government gold and monetary policy. The model which we
develop is suitable both for the study of historical gold standards and for
the analysis of a future gold standard.
Specifically, we wish to study three questions which arise in the context
of transition to and from a monetary gold standard:
(i)What is the inflationary effect of a policy to monetize gold at
some future date?
(ii)Given that a gold standard will be adopted, which monetary policy is consistent2
with pricestability and minimum disruption of thegoldmarket during
the transition to monetization?
(iii) If a monetary authority implements a gold standard but does not
adhere to the "discipline" of the standard, what is the anatomy of
thegoldstandard's collapse?
Qiiestions(i) and (ii) address recent plans for monetization while question(iifl
is posed to provide both some perspective for realistic policy discussion
and some tentative steps toward understanding the breakdown of the gold
standardin the 1930's.In addressing question (iii) we also propose a
technicaldefinition of the concept called"the discipline of thegold standard";
thedefinitionallows us toUctermine if a particular monetary policy is
consistent with "gold discipline".
Wepresentour analysis in four sections. TnsectionI weintroducethe
componentsof our model anddevelop equi I ibrjum price paths for a world where
agentsbelieve gold will never be money.In section ii we study gold's price
pathfollowing an announcement that gold will be monetized at a fixed future
date, with gold's price pegged at the prevailing market level on that date.
Section [II contains our analysis of the price level effects of moncti zation
alongwith our model'sprescription for monetization without inflation.In
section IV westudythe forced demonetization of gold, the collapse of a
gold standard. Section IV is followed by some concluding remarks and our
technical appendix. To maintain clarity of exposition most results will
I)e introduced in the text without proof; the detailed algebra involved
inthe proofs willbe left either to the appendix or to footnotes.3
I)Th&WorldWithout Monetary Gold
We will first analyze a world in which gold has no monetary u.se. Such
a world is very similar to that studied by S—H, except there will be no
government auctions. Throughout the paper we employ a continuous time model
in which agents have perfect foresight. To minimize technicalcomplexity,
we present our ideas in the context of a specific, linearized example.
We divide our economy into two sectors, a gold sector and amonetary
sector.Both the output ofgoods other than gold and the real rate of
interestr are fixed at constant levels exogenously to thegold and monetary
2 Sectors.
a)The Gold Sector




(3) q(t)=rq(t) for G(t) 0.
I is a fixed, total world stock of gold.3 D(t) is the quantity ofgold
which has been transformed for industrial or consumptionpurposes (or which
remains in the ground). G(t) is the quantity of gold privately heldas
ingots or coins insl)eculativehoards.E)*(q) is a target for the sumof
consumption and industrial demand, which depends negatively on (j(t) the
relative price of gold in terms of other goods.4'5 v is a positive, constant
speed of adjustment which may, if desired, depend onr;and we assume
Equation (1) states that the total supply of gold privately available
is held either in speculative hoards as ingots or in tile form of jewelryor
other consumption goods. Equation (2) is an adjustment equation which
indicates therateat which actual non-speculative holdings adjust to desired
non-speculative holdings. Equation (3) is a requirement thattherelative4
price of gold must increase at the real rate of interest for any gold to he
held in speculativeIoanIs.
Our goldsector model is similar to the gold model developed by S-Il.
We departfrom S-Ilinourequation (2)which allowsconsumers and producers
todisgorge gold from final uses. The S-Il model precludes the possibility
of gold's return to speculative hoards after its conversion to final use.
We have adopted this modificationboth because itcaptures the recently
observed disgorging of gold from consumption stocks and because it is tech-
nicallyconvenient to allow I) to hear no prior constraints.8
Equations (l)-(3) form a system of differential equations in l)(t)
and q(t). We assume that
(4) D*(q(t)) =
whereis a constant.
Intheremainder of thissection, we solve (l)-(4) for (1(t) and l)(t).
Equation (3)yields
(5) (lIt) =q(O)ert when C(t) > 0.
Substituting from (5) and (4) in (2) wederive
v -rt (6) I)(t)=—vl)(t)+ e
which has thesolution
(7) D(t)=l)(O)e_Vt+ 0(v-r) dT
To completethe solution in (7) we require an initial condition for l)(0)
anda condition onspeculative gold holding to determine q(0). First, we
assumethat t)(0) =0.Second, if Iis the date when l)(t) =0,G(T) must
equal zero,i.e.the speculativegold stock must he exhausted when there isflO5
furtheraccumulation of non-speculative gold. This requirement is the terminal
condition imposed by S-li, where speculative gold is held only inanticipation
of future non-Speculative gold accumulation.'0 Since G(T) =0,
(8) 1 =D(T)=D*(q(T))
Fromequations (4) and (8), we candetermine therelative price of gold
at thetimethatspeculativehoards are exhausted,
(1(T)
which, together with equation (5), yields
(9) q(0) =0-rT
In addition, theconditionthat I =1)(T),thenon-speculative gold
accumulation equation, (7), and ourassumed value D(0) =0imply









(12) q(0)= e r-v
b)The lonetary Sector
These results indicate that the relative price of gold and the quantity
of gold held in various categories are determined by the operation of the
gold sector alone. In orderto determine nominal prices, we must appcn(1 a
monetary sector to our model. The Operation of this sector will have no
realeffect ina modelinwhichgold has no monetary function; we introduce the6
monetarysector at this point to serve as a preliminary to the analysis in
Section II.




(14) M(t) =(( - r)P(t)-aP(t)
whereP(t) is the price level for all goods, M(t) is theexogenous money
supply and (3—ar) >0.
In this section we assume that M(t) =C, where C is





The nominal price path for gold is obtained by multiplying q(t), fromequation
(5), by P(t), from (15) with q(O) given by equation (12).7
IT)The World with an Announced Gold MonctizaIon
The monetization policy studied in this section will consist of a government's
unanticipated announcement that at a future time t=w it will fix the price of
gold at the nominal level prevailing at wandthat from.w onward speculative
gold holdings can be used as money4'15The announcement is assumed to occur at
time c, where
This policy differs from the relative gold price
pegging policy studied by S-H in that gold, which can be used for monetary
purposes, will generate the same service return that any money yields and in
thatweassume thatthe nominal price is pegged. However, the method which
we employ toanalyze the problem will be qulte similar to that of S-Il: we
firstdetermine a set of conditions whichmustprevail at the time of monetiza-
tionandthensolvebackward to find the initialrelative price at time c
i.rnpljedbyprofit maximizing behavior.
a) TheWorldafter Gold is 1oney
Ourgoal in this part is to derive an expression forthe relative price
of gold at the time of monetization w; such an expression will be essential
in linking the gold standard world to the basic system studied in section 1.
Because of the tedious algebra requi red to determine the path of the relativc
priceof gold, we willonly present a sketchof the required steps in the main
text andthenskip to the relative price solution. We leave the details to
the appendix.
Weassume that oniy gold held in speculative hoardsisa perfect substitute
forcurrency.If Q(w)= Q isthe nominal price of gold at t=w, equilibrium
in the money andgoldmarkets for t >wrequires




Equation(16)is equation (13) with the additional gold comI)onent added to
themoney supply; the nominalprice of gold is pegged at Q= Q(w)fort>w.
Substitutionfrom equation (4) into equation (2) produces equation (17)





whicharetwolinear differential equations in G(t) and P(t) •17 Equation (19)
isderived by substituting for E)(t) from equation (1').
Since the determinant of the system (18) -(19) is negative, the characteristic
polynomial has a positive rootA1,and a negative root A2,therefore, the
systemexhibits saddlepointstability.Steady-state values of the system are
=+ 1J/(-ar+)andG* =[I(-r)-/1/(13-r+).The stablesolution
fort>w obeys
(20) P(t) =((t)+ -LG*]
2 2
where A2 —v/ (Q(v+A2) ).lquation(20) ,whichwe depict in Figure 1 as the
line ss is the stable branch of (18) and(19). (See appendix for thesederivations.)
We areinterested in findingthe relativeprice of gold at time w.
1:qmiation(20) ,witht=w, providesone equation intheunknowns P (w) ,Q(w)=
and(;(w) .Thesystemiscompleted by using,inaddition to (20) ,equation(17)
wh i cli describesthe cvoltzt ionof non—speculative gold holding and equation
(lu),moneymarket equilibrium.En solving theabove we usethe requi rement
P(w) = C(w). Somesteps in the solution of this system are carried
2













Therelative price of gold depends on the quantity of gold used for
non-speculative purposes at the time of the monetization announcement, on the
speed of adjustment of non-speculative gold holdings, on the real rate of
interest, and on the long run non-speculative gold holding parameter, (S.
We wish to compare the relative price of gold in a world withmonetary
gold to the relative price derived in section 1. To do this we consider
the relative prices at time c.In particular, we will show that Q(c)/P(i;)
jumps atthe time of the announcement as long as w<T.
From equation (5) we need only discount Q(w)/P(w) by 0r( to
find
(r—v)(w—ó)
—V0C —-ra I )
—
(r—v)(w-c) (v-r)D(c)e
the relative price of gold intheinstant after the impendinggold
standard is announced. Prom equation (9), the relative price at the instant
before the announcement is q(c) =er( r-c)• and fromequation (7) wehave
viri (v-r)c -vc D(E) =—- e[e -lie .Wenay use these expressions to write the
ratio of the post- and pvc-announcement relative prices as




logr-logy Jhisratio equals unity when w =______ ______ = T.Ihus, f gold is to he
monetized after all gold enters non-speculative uses, the solution is identical
to that in section 1.It can easily be shownthat <0;so if
w<T, >i,i.e. ti'e announcement of monetization causes the relative q(c)
priceof gold to jump upward.'811
III) Inflation and the Gold Standard
In this section we analyze the inflationary effects of the gold monetiza-
tion policy proposed in section II.In addition we consider the monetary
policy which must accompany gold monetization in order to prevent price level
movements.
To begin, we note in Figure I that the pre-announcement price, P(c);
/(1-ar), the horizontal intercept of the P=0 schedule. The line ss is the
system's saddlepoint path after gold monetization; therefore, it indicatcs
the path for G(t), P(t.) for t>w.
With these facts we can readily establish that P(w)>P(). Since P(w)
is on ss and ss lies entirely to the right of P(c) it follows that P(w)>P(c).
Next,weconsider the behavior of Pat time cand during the period
(c ,wJ .WhileP may jump in an unforeseen mannerat time c, agents cannot expect
itto move discontinuously inthe future; otherwise, theexpected rate of
pricechange would be infinite at the time of a jump, producing money market
disequilibrium.Therefore, P moves smoothly (differentiably) to P(w)
during Cc,w
We can easily showthatduring the period (c,w] ,P>0.If, onthe contrary
P<()at some time in the interval, the money market can clear only if P<P(c)
since C is unchanged before w. This precludes the smooth rise of price to
P(w) .SinceP(t) >0, tc (c ,wI ,P(t)must lie between P(c) and P(w) ; hence
the initial jump a ftcr the moneti zation announcement is also to a price
between P(c) and P(w)
Tosummari zc,wefindthat the jri cc level jumps s inniItaneously Wi ththe
monetization announcement and rises smoothly until the date of monetization.
However, after time w,the price level andmonetary gold holdings willfollow
the path ss inFigure1 .IfG(w) <G ,thenprice will rise in a gold inflation,1.2
ultimately converging to P*. if G(w)>G*, the price level will dec Inc in
a gold deflation as gold is extracted from circulation and used for
consumption. The price level will he stable after time w only if G(w)_G*
Moncti zation without Inflation
1vidcntly, a governmentannouncement of eventual gold monetization cannot
succeedas a policy to avoid inflation in the absence of other measures.
Therefore,we wish to employ our framework to explore how a government simul-
taneously can announce the monetization of gold, avoid inflation and
minimize the disruption of the gold market.
Thepolicy van able availableto the governmentisthe amount of
tion-gold money,C, which wehave previously set atthe constantlevelC.




(24c) Q(t) U t>w
given monetization at w. Condition (24a) requires P to remain constant
indefinitely.(241)) and (24c) require Q both to move cont iniionsiy at the rate
rbetweenand w and to remain constant after w; in parti cul ar, (241))
prevents Q from jumping di scont inuously at t ime c
We can use the money ma rket to determine the requl red path for C:
(25a) C(t)=C(c) ,
(25b) C(t) =P(s)[-ar-Q(c)e G(w) t=w
(25c) C(t) =Qflr(w-c)(;() t>w13
Inthe above equations, G(w) equals I—[)(w); and I)(w)can he den ved
from (7) as
-vw (v-r)w (v-r)c-
(26) E)(w) =D(c)e + :r) -e I
Inaddition, for t>w, G(t) can bedetermined from equation (19) by setting
P(t)=P()
From time c unti.1 w, the policy requires that Cremainsconstant. At
r(w-c) time w,Cmust decline by the amount Q(w)(.(w)=Q(e)e ('4w) to accommodate
monetized gold. Following w, the government stabilizes price byexactly
balancingwithcurrency injections or withdrawals the value of gold which
leaks into or out of consumption and industrial use.
Theonlycomponent of the policy lacking insimplicityis (25h); this
element's complexity arises from the goal of minimizing thedisruption to
thegoldmarket.Indeed, any discrete reduction inCat time w would, when
combined with (25a) and (25c), stabilize P. However,any reduction in C
other than (25b) will disturb the gold market.'9j_4
IV)Anatomyof a Crisis (Demonetization.) in the Cold Market
Tn previous sections we did not account for government gold reserves
since, except fo.r fixing the price of gold, the government was passive; merely
its willingness to intervene was sufficient to produce the derived results.
however, if the government adopts additional policies which potentially
conflict with the maintenance of a gold standard, we may no longer treat
gold market intervention as implicit; rather, we must directly consider the
government's role in the gold market.
In this section we introduce government gold reserves, R, and initially
assumethat the government ss;csthe overall money growth rateat the positive
constantg. With finite R such a money growth policy must lead to a break-
down of the gold stmdard.2° In addition, it is possible for the gold
standard to break down even if money is decreasing, providing that prior to
the inception of the gold standard there was "too much" money in cxi stence.
ABreakdownwithConstant Money Growth
We canreadily show that tilegoldstandard must collapse when money grows
at aconstant, posItive rate.If there were no breakdown and money grewat
therate g, then P mustrise at tile rate g. Since P rises, q=Q/P mustdecline
at the rate g; then i)*6/q rises at the rate g. Therefore, I)* and D increase
toward infinity, which isincompatible with a finite R.It follows thatthe
gold standard must collapse at some time.
ouranalysis of thedynamics of a gold standard col lapse draws di rect ly
from Krugman' s (1979) studyofthe breakdown of a fixed exchange rate system.
In Krugman's paper, a small country's monetary authority fixes the price of
foreignexchangeand expandsthedomestic component of the money supply at
a positive,constant rate. Eventual ly, a crisis mustoccur;there is a runon15
themonetary authority's foreign exchange holdjjigs and an end to the fixed
exchange rate.
In Krugman's model the exchange rate and the price level are essentially
thesame variable;no relative price effects arise from the crisis. Our
modelof a gold market crisis displays the Krugman-type run ongovernment
stocks, but it extends his analysis by allowing for real effects of the
CT!SI S.
Wenow define I as the total stock of gold inclusive of government
reserves,
(27) 1=R(t) + G(t)+D(t)
While gold is money, the money supply is, as before, M(t) =C(t) + i)G(t).
Ifthe government sets H on a "crisis path", rising at the.positive rate g,
thenat some time z a crisis must occur in the gold market. At the time of
the crisis QG(z) will be demonetized; also, R(z) in currency will be exchanged
for government gold during the run on government stocks. In all, the money
stock at the instant of the crisis must fall by
(28) Q(R(z) +G(z))=Q(I
—D(z)
where the equality follows from (27).Thus,the time path of the money stock is
(29a) H(t) =1(0)gt , t<z
(29b) H(t) =1(0)gZQ1i—E)(z) j , t=z
(29c) M(t) ()(t_.z) ,
Weshould emphas.i ze that while gold is money' the government maycontrol the
growth rate of Nhut may not control the division of Mbetween C and Q(. Because
thesize of C is indeterminate, the size of R is also indeterminate. However,
for the problem of determining the time of the crisis,onlythe allocation16
of I between 1) and (R÷G) is important.
Nextwe will employ(29a)-(29c) to determine both the pro-crisis price
path and thetime ofthecrisis. Crucial to our analysis is the recognition
thatspeculators will force the crisis to take place without any foreseen
jumps in Por Q.





where A = > 0.For t<z we use equations (29a)-(29c) in (.30) to obtain
(31) P(t) ={j[(x)t} -
Fort=z (31) becomes
(31i) P(z) =_±ic__-{M(0)eö[iDjj}
Both (31) and (31a) depend onthe,asyet, unknown values of l)(z) and z.
Tofindthesevalues we use both ourknowledge about consumption gold accumu-
lationand the condition that Qcannotjump at the moment of crisis. After
the crisis, the relative price of gold can be determined from the model in
section I as
S—r(T—z) (32) q(z) =— e
whereT, as before, is the choke date. Since DF) =1,we require
fF(v-r)T
(33) 1I)(z)-v( I-z)+ye1e 1de(z)' dT
(33a) i=2.(J .v(T_z)+v[1 -(r-v)(T-z)
v-r
l;quation (33a) follows directly from (33), and (33)isa reinterpreted version17
of equation (7). Equation (33a) may, in principle,be solved for 'F as a
functionof D(z) ,z,and 1, i.e.
(34) T(D(z),z, 1).with 1 0.
Therequirement that gold's price does not jump at time z is
(35) (1(Z) =Q/P(z).
Sinceq(z) is identical in (32) and (35), we substitute from (34) to derive
(36) = z, I)-z]
P(z)
I:quat ions (31a) and (36) are twoequati oiis in the threeunknownsP(z) ,D(z)
and z. Thethirdequation,whichcan he usedto coniplete the solution, is
theaccumulation equation
(37) fl(z) =D(0)e"+ veZ
Itis evident that closed form solutions to z are unlikely, even in
simple models. In practice, numerical techniques would be required to derive
z for particular parameter values.
AGold Standard Inconsistent Currency Love I
Thata gold standard must eventually collapse from an inflationary money
creation process agrees with intuition. Less obvious is the possibility
thata gold standard may collapse in a period of monetary andpricedecline.18
Asan exampleof such acase,we generalize thepost-monet i zati dynamics
ofequations(18) and (19) by allowing for government reserve holdings R(t).
ThegovernmentchangesConlybyexchangingcurencyfor itsreservesatthe
fixed price Q;otherwise,itdoesnot intervenein the moneyor gold markets.
Themoney supply at. any time that the gold standard exists is then
(38) M(t) =(C-
QR&+Q(R(t)+G(t))
where R0 is the quantity of gold reserves and C is the quantity of outstanding
21
currencyat tile beginning of the analysis (t=O).
The dynamic system analogous to (18)—(19) is
(18a) P(t) =-arP(t) -Q(R(t)÷G(t))-CQR()
(19a) [R(t)+G(t)j = P(t)-v(R(t)+ G(t)) + vi.
Q
The solution to the system is similar to that for (l8)-(19).Pand (R÷G)
converge ultimately to the steady state values N and [R*+G*] ; however, nothing
guarantees that (R*+I*) is positive. Indeed, [R*+G =[I(8-ar)
—6(C-QR0/Q] / (8 -ax'+6)
canhenegativeifthe term 6(C-QR0)/ is large enough.
We have depicted the case of a negative (R*+G*J in Figure II. The (R+G)=O
andP=()loci are analogous to those in Figure 1, except that the steady state
value for R*+C* is negative. Since the consumption demand for gold tinder
tiìis gold standard eventually exceeds tile total available, the system must
collapse at sonic I)Oint.At the time of the collapse, currency will he exchanged
for all the governments reserves at the fixed rate Q; andgold will cease to
hemoney. hence ,thepost—collapse money stockwillhe C —
QR(); and thepr i cc
levelwill be (C-QR0)/(8—ar) ,representedby point A in Figure II.
Inordertopreventtheinfinite profits associated with price level










thecollapse. Similarly, to prevent a jump in the nominal gold price Q,
theremust still be some gold inthe hands of the publicatthe time of the
collapse. The gold price then gradually rises, thereby reducing the slope
of the (R+G)=O locus and rotating it counter-clockwise until it intersects
the P-axis at A. The lines through the points FIIA represent the path
followed bythe price level and (R÷G). The Fit segment, located to the left
of the stable manifold ss, is a solution Path for the system (l8a)-(l9a).
Thus,wehave forced a collapse of the gold standard even when the money
stock and prices continually fall; formal derivations of these results
togetherwith an equati on determining the timing of the collapse arc presented
in theappend:ix.
Gold Discipline
Inthe two preceding examples, we have demonstrated that a gold standard
can collapse 1)0th when aninflationarymonetary policy is in effect and when
money and prices are declining. In this section we explore the restrictions
on the money supply process which guarantee that a gold standard will survive
indefinitely. We call such a restricted policy a strictly_gold-disciplined
money 1)011 cy, and we seek a means of determi fling whether a particular policy
is strictly golddiscijlined. One such method, presented in the appendix,
consists of solving directly for z, the time of the collapse. If a finite
solutionfor z exists, then the monetary policy can be classified as a z-year
gold-disciplined policy; if z is infinite, then the monetary policy is strictly
gold-disciplined.In the main text, wedevelopan equivalent method.
A policy is a sequence of money growth rates g(t). We model government
caused money growth, i.e. all changes inthemoney supplyexcept that discon-
tinuouschange associatedwith the gold standard collapse, as a smooth
The money supply at anytimet isthen21
rt
J (39a) M(t) =M(O)e0 t<z
Jg(h)dh




where k(z) is the amount of money destroyed when the gold standard collapses
at tfme z.
Our model requires I> l)(t), Vt, which is a real resource constraint
holding independently of the monetary regime. The real resource constraint
applicable to the gold standard is I >D(t),Vt.A gold standard, once
imposed, will collapse if and only if agents foresee that. in the absence of a
collapse there would he some finite t when I =D(t).
We define a strictly gold-disciplined money growth policy as a policy such
that
I >D(t) Vt
whereI)(t)isthevalueof D(t) constructed from equations (30)and (37)
usingthe moneygrowth policy and setting k(z)O. WeemphasizethatD(t)
neednot he less than or equal to I. The [)(t) values arc, for our model,
a sequence of hypothetical values calculated by setting k(z)O.










Vt+vetf Aj eVTdT O
By setting k(z)O we find
D(t)= D(O)et+eJf J0j&0]3djTd1T




[M(O)eOI edi}e Q 0,
forallt>O.
We argued previously that a policy of money growth at the constant
Positive rate g must lack guid discipline. To gain intuition about the
applicability of our definition we will calculate fl(t) for the policy g(t)=g>()





Recallthat we require A>g. Our expression for D(t) grows without bound as
t rises. hence we can not have i>D(t) for all t.23
V) Conclusion and Extensions
A government may announce the fixing of the nominal price of gold ina
numberofdifferent environments. Gold may currently circulate along with
fiatmoney as part of the money supply witha freely floating nominal price
ofgold.Alternatively, gold may have no monetary role until the fixing
of its nominal price. In this paper we have analyzed the movement of the
price of gold in the latter case.Tn the context of our model we have shown
that only a very Special money supply process willprevent inflation when
gold is monetized.In addition we have devised a method for determining the
timing of a gold standard's collapse and produced a formal definition of
"the discipline of the gold standard."
'I'he model employed may be developed in a number ofways. The model
specifies a fairly simple demand and supply behavior for money and gold rather
than invoking explicit maximizing behavior. Also,agents are assumed to
have perfect foresight. We think that it is worthwhile toplace our model
of a gold standard's collapse in a stochastic environment. Given sucha
framework itis possible to investigate the collapse of the1920's go]d
standard to determine if it was vial)le when it was formed.24
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Footnotes
I Lafforproposes tohavethegovernment announcethat gold will hemone-
tizedat the market price prevailing on a certain future date. To prevent
inflationin the interim,the government woul.d follow an "austere" monetary policy
andsell, a large portion of its gold holdings.
2 can easily relax the fixity of other goods, providing that other
goods are given exogenously to the model developed here. Allowing for changes
in the real rate of interest would greatly complicate our analysis; thus,
the development of -our models is an exercise in partial equilibrium analysis.
In (S-Il), r is given exogenously and output of other goods is ignored.l.n Barro,
both r and goods production are exogenous.
3UnLil section IV we ignoregovernment gold stocks.
4it is possible to interpret1)*(q(t)) and E)(t) as desired and actual
consumption holthngs of gold plus desired and actual gold remaining in the
ground, respectively. T en the model allows for gold to be mined at increasing costs.
5Our model coiitansan analogue to the choke price used by(S-li).When
f)*(q (t) 1 =[)(t),I)(t)=0,and there i s no further change in specul at ive gold
holding. The (1(t) for which this condition holds is the analogue of the choke
P iCC.
nan opt imi zi iig model, the speed of adjustment, v, would depend on r.
We avoid the complex problems that this causes by fixing r.
If q/q <r,there would he no demand, for speculative gold holdings, and
the pri cc of gold wouldfalldiscontinuously. If q/q >r,speculative demand
wouldcause a discontinuous upward jumpi n gold pri cc. Since forsecable
discoutinuousjumps in q are not consi stent with speculative equi Ii hriiim, l
must followequation (3).
thereis no gold mining, equation (2) is identical to Barro's (1979)
adjustment equation for non—monetary gol.d except thatwedon't include depre- ciation. To theextentthat there is gold mininginour model., equation(2)
differsfrom liarro's adjustment equation because our D is the difference between
newly consumed andnewlymined gold.
We have also explored an alternative form for theD*function which
includes anticipated capita.1 gains to gol.d holding as anargument;this form
does not substantively change our results. See theappendix for this analysis.
9'Fhis asstlmpt ionPrecludes theO5S 1)1 ii tyofcost 1 y go] ci production. Gold
existsas a pile of purebars,all of which are contained initially inspeciila—
t iyeholdings. Thisisthe same assumptionthatS—liemploy,and Itgreatly
sinip] i fi es theensulrig algebra. An assumption thatl)(0)>(1a 11 owsforthe
cxistenceof gold nil ties; but S I rice suchinitiCSmake no quail tatVCdi fie relice
intheeffect of a monetization announcement on relative prices, itishelpful
toignore them.
101fG(T) >0equation(5)iniplies that q(t)continuesto risc' for t>T.
If(1(t)cont limes to rise after T, equation(2) indicates that l)(t)< 0, so G(t)
willri so fort>T.But such speculativehoardswillneverbeusedfornon-
speculative purposes since I)(t) remains negative. Therefore, G(T)=0.26
reportin thetext so1tionsfor rv. •Solutionsareeasilyattainable
for the SCCjulcase r=v but equations (10) and (11) become
(10') 1
(11') 1 =1/v=hr




where y(t) istheamount of other goods produced in the economy. The solut ion
for price(given a constant y(t) and M(t))wouldthenbe P(t) =iM(t)/y(t)]/(—cLr)
Alternatively,we can assume that M(t)/yt)6 moves exogenously; if so then
most of the following analysis holds, except that LM(t)/y(t)1isused in
placeof M(t)
13.
1100(1and(arbcr(1 980) testa model very muchlikeequation(14 ) and
cannot reject the hypothesis that P'ice responds only to market fundamentals.
14Thatgold cannot be used as money prior to its monetization is a fairly
extreme assumption, but itseemsto characterize current gold use.
15Thefixingof the pri cc of gold at a giving future time hasa precedent
in theGreenback periodof the U.S.In 1875, Congress passed a lawrequi ring a return to the gold standard in .January, 1879 at thepre—Ci vii War pan ty.
in this case gold circulated as money with afluctuating greenback exchange
rate.For dctai ls, see Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Ch. 2.
16Sjfl(eLaffer' s proposal for monetization includesintenini government
reserve sales, it is more complex than the policystudied here.it ishard
toreconcile Laffer's policy with interim price level stab1ity (see Section III).
assumeherethat thequantity ofgold inspeculativehoards is
greateiiouh that merely the will ingnessof thegovernment to intervenei 11
causethe priceof gold to be fixed;however, thegovernment need notactually intervene. hence ,wecan ignore movements i.n government reserves.In sect ion TV
we generalize the model to the case in which the government must intervene
directly with its reserves to preserve the gold standard.
81t is possible to extend the model toan uncertain world in which the
timingof the future fixing to gold is unknown.Inthe append i x ,weexplore
sucha case and determine the time c relative price of gold that must prevai 1.
1earl ,wenni st as stimethat the i n i t i a 1 vaI iieofC i s I a rge enought )
accommodatethe des i red monet i zationof p' i vate goldwithout an increase in
nominalmoney balances.
20
Agold standard issaidto break down when a private run on government
reserves exhausts those reserves. As Krugnian has riotedagovernment may
divide reserves i nto primary and secondar rese rves w i th on Iv primary reserves
l)e i ng coimni t ted to the price fi xi iig p0 ii cy .Thus,agold st.aiida rd maY break
(town when primary reservesarc exhausted butsecondary reserves remain intact27
21
More genera Ely, we could begin theanalysisattimec, the moment that the future monetization ofgold .i s announced. Agents at timewouldreali ze
thatthegold standard to beimplemented at w will not be permanently viable.
They willprepare for the expected demonetization so that at time w the nominal
and relative prices of goods and gold and the quantity ofconsumption gold
holdings will be different from the results of section TI.
Still more generally, the government may hold secondary and tertiary
gold reserves in preparation for new gold standards to be established at some
timeafter the collapse of the current standard; i.e. to defend thecurrent standard inthe crisis, itwill only expend a known part of its total reserve.
'litI s rhythmi c wi thdrawal from and returnto the gold standard wi 11 reflect
itself in yet different paths for the price level andgold consumption from
thosewhich we have examinedthus far.
22
A possible (though veryconjectural) application of this analysis is to
thestudy of the reestablishment and cot Iajse of the inter-war gold standard.
The U.S. continuously used a gold standard until 1933, but othermajor
countries, i.e,. Germany (1924), Great Britain (1925), France (1927), fixed
their currencies to gold in the 1920's.It is often suggested that the gold
parities which were established were "inappropriate". here we can interpret
"Inappropri ate" to mean that there was too much currencyoutstanding in the world tomaintain the viability of the gold standard.28
Appendi x
-[)erivationof Equation (21)
SinceG(w) =I-I)(w)we use equation (7) and the condition q(c) =q(w)e
with q (w) =Q(w)/P(w) in equation (2U) to obtain




and weuseG(w)=I—D(w),equation(7) ,andq(c) =q(w)eralong with
P(w) = G(w)in equation (16) to obtain
a(v+A)
(A2) + 2[Q(w)(TD(E)cV()-P(w)v(1C(r )(wc) =
a(v+2)
t-c-a(v+A)IP(w) + I Q(w)
2
Since w-c is given, and D() and I arc given,equations (Al) and (A2) are a






whichis equation (21) in the text. An interesting aspect of (A3) ,whichwe
do not have much intuition about, is that it is entirely independent of
moneymarketparameters.29
IT —Solutionto theSystem(18)—(19)
In this appendix we derive equation(20), the stable manifold for G(t)
and P(t) 'after monetization. Equations(18) and (19) are a system of
differential equations in G(t) and P(t).The steady state values of the
C+QI systemare G* =— — andP* =
B—ar+6
The determinant of the homoegenoussystem is
8—ar —Q
Det _!(8_ar+6) <0. a
—v
Sincethe determinant is egative, the roots ofthe system are of opposite
sign, indicating saddle point type stability. Assumethat the roots are







with A1 =—s---——-andA2 = .Forstability we require that C1 0.
Q(v+A1) Q(v+A2)
Therefore, P(t) =G(t)+ (P* G*).30
III—SubjectiveProbabilities over Monetization
In this section, we generalize, the model of section IT, to the case in
which agents have a probability density function over the timing of monetization.
Fortunately, most of the required drudgery has already been done in section II
because the solution for the time c relative price of gold falls easily out
ofequation (22). This case is similar in form to the various policies studied
by Salant and Henderson when agents are uncertain about the timing of policy
implementation. The results which we derive here can be employed in an alter-
native interpretation of the relative gold price movements described in the
firstpages of Salant and Ilehderson.
We will assume that our gold speculators arc riskneutral and that the
subjective p.d.f. over the time w of monetization is the same exponential
p. d. f. used by Salant andHendersonin their appendix, i.e.
-ó(w-)
(a) f(w) =ye for w >
Therelative l)rice solution in equation (22) is conditioned on a particular
announcementtime c and monetization time w.Here we assume that at time E
thegovernmentannounces thatgold will l)e monetized atsome uncertain future
timew with the p. d. f. over w given by (a).Let us denote the relative price
solutionin(22)asQ/P(r/w), to indicate that itis conditional on the time
of monetizat i on.
Riskneutral speculators will act to set actual relative price at time c
equal to the weighted average of the Q/P(e/w) 's, where the weights arcgiven
in(a). The expected return to speculative gold holding at c will then equal
the real rate of interest. However, as long as the actual monetization does
not occur, the relativeprice of gold must rise atahigher rate thanthe
realrate of interest.31
We proved in section II that if w>T,Q/P(/w)>q(c).The expected value
of Q/P(/w)canbe writtcn as








Thedetermination of the time path for Q/P(c/w), conditionalon monetization's
not yet having occurred, has proven to be intractable (for us).32
TV-Determinationof z for the Case of too MuchInitialCurrency
1) The money SUPPlY is
(la) M(t) =(C-QR0) + (C(t) + R(t)) t<z
(ib) M(t)=- QR0 t>z






C_QR0+QJ where13* = .Thiscomes from the original P, G solution notes, 13-ar +
andwe will determine C1, C2 later. After z, themoney supply is fixed





3)Just after the run, the relative price of gold is q(z) =- e1C
I (
toprevent price jumps. But since P(z) =(C-R0)/(B-ar),
_r(T_z)=____
C-QR0)
Thenwe can solve for 1— z:
T -z=-1log1QI(13-) F r (OR)














= , A= , and(C*+1*) =
B-ar+
Q(v+A1) Q(v+A2)33
From (4a) we solve forC1 in terms of C2:
-ö(v+A ) v+A C = [I—D(o)—(R*+G*)]—C 1 vó
2v+A2
Using (2a) we can solve for
C2 explicitly:
Q(v+A)
p(z)_p* + [I —
= v6
2 v+A A,z _____ Le —____
2
Thus, we can solve forC1,C2 in terms of the parameters, the initial,
and the terminal conditions. This determinesexactly the price path.
5)Now we must find z. From equation (33a),




Fromthe accumutation equation for D(z),
(5b)D(z) =D(O)e + veJZ JP(t)eTdr
Weknow what D(z) must be from (5a). Thenwe need only plug in our
pricepath in (Sb), integrate andsolvefor z. The integral is essentially
P(T)eTdT
C1 j
el)TdT +2e2)TdT + p* VTd
=C1[e1_ij +





5ve 1[e1+h1_l]+2 [e2"_l]+ [e'-i)J
v+A1 v+A2 v
All we have to do is find the z which solves (5c)35
V — Analysis with an Alternative D*
In the text we assumed that the target va1e of D is
D* =6/q.This simple form was chosen because of its tractability. In this
appendix we demonstrate that none of the conclusions we reach in the text
would be altered by changing our assumption about D* to conform with that
assumed by Barro. In our notation, one functional form which has the
2+63 (q/q)
qualitative properties assumed by Barro (1979, pg. 15) is D* = +
q
where y is real output, assumed constant in our paper, and the linearization
is appropriate only over ranges where[62+tS3q/q] >0.We differ from Barro in
that he assumed unit income elasticity, but this does not seem substantive for
present purposes.
With the new specification of D* we may write the differential equation
system (18),(19) from the text as
(*) p=—cxr —
62 63(B—cxr) 63 53C (**) G =v(—(-——_______ —(— +1)G]+ vii—6 —6y — —1 - - c 0 1 -
Q Qcz
Toderive (**) use (*) in place of P in the target and note that after monetization
qjq =-P/P.
6263(—czr) If(—— — ) is positive then the phase diagram of (* ) and (** ) is
Q Qa
qualitatively identical to Figure I in the text and the analysis of the model
62 63(1—ctr) isessentially unchanged. However, if — — — <0then the
9 Qci
phase diagram appears as in Figure A. The important point about this figure
is that, if positive, the slope of the G=0 schedule is less than that of the
P=0 schedule. The slopes of these schedules are










It is evident from Figure A that the stable branch, ss, is qualitatively
unchanged from Figure I. Finally note that in the steady state q/q-.P/P=0
andhencefor the steady state including the rate of return variable is
irrelevant.37
Figure A
'3-0<-